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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action commenced by Plaintiff-Respondent
Management Services Corporation ("Management Services"), purchaser, against Development Associates ("Development Associates"),
seller, for the alleged breach of a Uniform Real Estate Contract
dated December 7, 1976 ("the contract"), wherein Management
Services agreed to purchase eight (8) lots in the Daybreak
Phase III Subdivision for $80,000.00.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the trial of this matter, the Honorable Peter F.
Leary, sitting without jury, held that the contract was
divisible; that Management Services defaulted with respect
to an installment payment of $19,800.00 due on or before
March 1, 1977; that Development Associates properly forfeited
Management Services' interest in two of the eight lots purchased under the contract; and that Development Associates
wrongfully terminated the contract with respect to the
remaining six lots.

The Court awarded judgment to Management

Services on its Third Cause of Action for the amount of
$7,700.00 in lost profits; $2,438.00 lost commissions;
$600.00 in earnest money; and attorney's fees in the amount
of $1,850.00.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Development Associates seeks reversal of the Court's
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reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Development Associates
in the defense of this action.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
On December 7, 1976, Management Services entered
into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with Development Associates
for the purchase of eight (8) lots in the Daybreak Phase III
Subdivision in Salt Lake County, Utah (R. 129, 266).

The

following language appears on the face of the contract:
"2. WITNESSETH:
That the Seller, for
the consideration herein mentioned agrees
to sell and convey to the buyer, and the
buyer for the consideration herein mentioned
agrees to purchase the following described
real property, situate in the County of
Salt Lake, State of Utah, to-wit: More
particularly described as follows:
Lots #309, #310, #311, #312, #313, #314,
#315, #316 Daybreak Phase III Subdivision
as recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorders
Office.
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter
into possession and pay for said described
premises the sum of Eighty Thousand Dollars
($80,000.00) payable at the office of Seller,
his assigns or order 307 W. 200 S., SLC,
Utah 84101 strictly within the following
times, to-wit: Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00)
cash, the receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged, and the balance of $79,200.00
shall be paid as follows:
Beginning March 1, 1977, buyer to
complete payment on two (2) lots
($19,800.00) and thereafter to close
two (2) lots on the first of each
month. Total amount to be paid on
or before June 15, 1977.
Possession of said premises shall be delivered
to buyer on the 7th day of December, 1976."
(R. 9, 10).
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The contract does not specifically state which
particular lots Management Services intended to pay for on
March 1, 1977 or any subsequent month (R. 9).
Management Services never made the $19,800.00
payment which was due on or before March 1, 1977.

On

March 19, 1977, Development Associates caused a contract
forfeiture notice to be served upon Edward A. White

("Mr.

White"), President of Management Services (R. 4, 11).

On

March 25, 1977, Development Associates received a letter
from Management Services dated March 23, 1977, signed by
Mr. White, President, stating in part as follows:
"(2) We are ready to take title to
lots 311 and 312 immediately.
The
funds are now in escrow at Western
States Title Insurance Co. for Lot
311.
The funds will be deposited
with them immediately for Lot 312
upon their notification that they
have all of the closing documents
ready."
(R. 13, 251).
Paragraph 16 of the contract provides in part
that in the event Management Services fails to comply with
the terms of the contract, or upon their failure to make
payments when due or within fifteen days thereafter,
Development Associates has the option to be released from
all obligations in law and equity upon Management Services'
failure to remedy the default within five days.

The contract

further provides that all payments made by Management Services
prior to that time would be forfeited to Development Associates
Sponsored by the S.J.damaoes
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Mr. White was very familiar with real estate transactions generally, having been involved in the real estate
business either as an agent or broker since 1961 (R. 153).

Mr.

White further testified that between 1961 and 1976, he had
participated in at least two or three hundred transactions
involving Uniform Real Estate Contracts similar to the one
here at issue (R. 154, 155).

Indeed, shortly before Management

Services filed this action against Development Associates, Mr.
White was a party in another action wherein default was alleged
under Paragraph 16 of a Uniform Real Estate Contract.

Mr.

White testified that he was thoroughly familiar with the
language of Paragraph 16 and the basic idea of forfeiture
(R. 155, 156).
Development Associates refused to accept the conditior.s]
imposed by Mr. White in his response to the contract forfeiture
notice; deemed Management Services' interest in the subject
lots forfeited; and retained $800.00 in earnest money as
liquidated damages.

Management Services subsequently commenced

this action, seeking title to the eight lots in question, or
in the alternative, damages for breach of contract.

ARGUMENT
THE PARTIES INTENDED THE CONTRACT TO
BE "ENTIRE" AND THAT ANY DEFAULT WOULD
APPLY TO ALL EIGHT LOTS
The pivotal issue in this appeal is primarily an
issue
of law and can be stated as follows:
Did the trial
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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court err in concluding that the Uniform Real Estate Contract
dated December 7, 1976 was a "divisible" contract?

More

specifically, did Management Services default with respect
to all eight lots, or, as the trial court concluded, just
"the first two lots"?
An analysis of the general rules regarding divisibility
or severability of contracts is appropriate.
"No formula has been devised which
furnishes a test for determining in all
cases what contracts are severable and
what are entire.
The primary criterion
for determining the question is the
intention of the parties as determined
by a fair construction of the terms and
provisions of the contract itself, by
the subject matter to which it has
reference, and by the circumstances of
the particular transaction giving rise
to the question. Whether a contract is
entire or divisible cannot be determined
by a single term, phrase, or sentence,
even though it is broad enough to include
such meaning, unless, throughout the
whole agreement and from the surrounding
circumstances, it definitely appears
either that it was or that it was not
the intention of the parties that the
contract should be entire and indivisible.
If, in this respect, the parties themselves
have placed a certain construction on the
contract, that is to be considered, and
acts of the parties in treating the contract as entire or severable have an
important bearing on its construction.
A factor in determining whether a contract
is entire or severable is whether the
parties reached an agreement regarding
the various items as a whole or whether
the agreement was reached by regarding
each item as a unit.
A contract to do
several things at several times is
divisible in its nature if there is no
manifestation of a contrary intent.
Obviously, however, if the intention
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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there is no room for construction.
A contract may, both in its nature and
by its terms, be severable and yet be
made entire by the intention of the
parties.
As a means of ascertaining the
intention of the parties, various
tests have been adopted.
According
to some authorities, the criterion is
to be found in the question whether the
quantity, service, or thing as a whole
is of the essence of the contract.
If
it appears that it is to be performed
only as a whole, the contract is entire.
Thus, the best test is said to be whether
all of the things, as a whole, are of
the essence of the contract: that is, if
it appears that the purpose is to take
the whole or none, the contract is entire;
otherwise, it is severable. Another
test supported by a number of authorities
is that a contract is entire when, by
its terms, nature, and purpose, it
contemplates that each and all of its
parts are interdependent and common to
one another and to the consideration,
and is severable, when, in its nature
and purpose, it is susceptible of divisions and apportionment, and has two
or more parts in respect to matters or
things contemplated and embraced by the
contract which are not necessarily
dependent upon each other. Still another
test that has been suggested is the
possibility or impossibility of a certain
apportionment of benefits, according to
the compensation in the contract, in
case of part performance only.

* * *
In construing a contract to determine
whether it is entire or severable, many
of the courts have regarded the singleness
or apportionability of the consideration
as an important test--that is, if the
consideration is single, the contract is
entire, but if the consideration is
expressly or by necessary implication
apportioned, the contract is severable.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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under a contract, and the money consideration to be paid is apportioned to each
of the items, the contract is ordinarily
regarded as severable. On the other hand,
if the consideration to be paid is single
and entire, the contract will ordinarily
be held to be entire, although the subject
thereof may consist of several distinct
and wholly independent items.
The principle by which the courts are governed
when they declare that a contract about
several things but with a single consideration in gross is entire and not severable
is that it is impossible to affirm that
the party making the contract would have
consented to do so unless he had supposed
that the rights to be acquired thereunder
would extend to all the things in question.
However, the singleness or apportionability
of the consideration, although important,
is only one of the essential facts to be
considered, and will not necessarily
prevail over other factors, or provisions
of the contract, indicating a contrary
intent.

* * *
An agreement which embraces a number
of distinct subjects that admit of being
separately executed and closed is, as a
general rule, to be taken distributively
or severally as to each subject. A contract
is severable where the part to be performed
by one party consists of several distinct
and separate items and the price to be paid
by the other is apportioned to each item
or is left to be implied by law. But this
method of determining whether a contract
is entire or severable will not override
the clear intention of the parties, if
such intention can be gathered from the
whole subject matter of the contract. While
the severable nature of the subject may
often assist in determining the intention,
it will not overcome the intent to make
an entire contract when that is shown.
Ultimately, the entirety of a contract
depends upon the intention of the parties,
and not upon the divisibility of the subject
the Law
number
of for
distinct
subjects.
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* * *
The fact that a contract calls for
performance in instalments does not
necessarily make it a divisible contract.
Whether such a contract is divisible or
entire generally depends upon the intention
of the parties ascertained by a construction
of the contract. A provision in an entire
contract for payment in instalments, which
instalments are not referable to severable
items or portions of the performance but
are referable to the performance of the
whole, does not render or characterize
such contract severable. Although, in
some cases, contracts to pay for work in
instalments have been declared to be
severable, there are many others in which
such contracts have been held to be entire
and indivisible.
Similar principles control with regard
to whether a contract in which the compensation is fixed at a certain amount per
unit of work done is entire or severable.
Whether such a contract is entire or
severable depends upon the intention of
the parties as ascertained from a construction of the contract as a whole and also,
where it is necessary in order to determine
that intention, from the surrounding
circumstances.
Applying these principles
the courts in some cases have reached the
conclusion that the contract being construed was entire, and in others that it
was severable." 17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts,
Sections 325-328 at pages 758-763 (emphasis
added)
In Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products,
Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P.2d 446 (1973), this Court upheld as
"entire" the lower court's construction of a lease agreement a~
separate option, observing as follows:
"In attempting to overturn the
trial court's ruling that the lease and
the "Added Option" were intended to be
one integrated transaction the defendant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney argues
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that if the two agreements can be
segregated and carried out separately,
that should be done.
The soundness of
that doctrine in appropriate fact
situations is not doubted. But the
trial court appears to have been concerned with other basic principles of
contract law, which have more specific
application to the instant fact situation.
The most fundamental of these is that the
meaning and effect to be given a contract
depends upon the intent of the parties,
and that this is to be ascertained by looking at the entire contract, and all of its
parts in their relationship to each other;
and this principle applies to whether they
intended separate aspects of their contract
to be severable, and that if this results in
uncertainty, he may and should look to
extraneous evidence concerning the background and surrounding circumstances in
order to make that determination."
515 P. 2d at 448. (emphasis added)
Boesiger v. DeModena, 88 Idaho 337, 399 P.2d 635 (1965)
is an action by vendors for breach of a contract to convey several
lots to vendee at $2,000.00 each, three lots of which would later
be reconveyed from vendee to vendor for $1,500.00 each.

The

contract also involved several agreements, one of which was that
vendor should make certain off-site improvements on the lots, such
as sidewalks, curb and paving, irrigation pipe, and water pipe,
before a given date.

In his motion to dismiss on grounds that

seller failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted,
buyer filed an affidavit stating that on the date of the contract,
buyer had been and was married, and that all property acquired
by him became community property.

The trial court treated the

motion as one for summary judgment and dismissed the action.

On

appeal, the issue of severability arose in conjunction with the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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issue of whether buyer, as a married person, could be constrained to reconvey the three lots in question since after
the initial conveyance they became community property of him
and his wife.

Because she was not a party to the contract,

claimed by buyer, the clause of the contract requiring reconveyance of the lots could not be upheld.
In reversing and remanding the case, the Idaho

Supr~e

Court stated that apportionment of consideration was a question
to be resolved but that this was only one factor to be considered
in the divisibility question.
"A contract may both in its nature and by
its terms be severable and yet rendered
entire by the intention of the parties.
We think that perhaps the best test is
whether all of the things, as a whole,
are of the essence of the contract.
That
is, if it appeared that the purpose was to
take the whole or none, then the contract
would be entire; otherwise, it would be
severable. Wooten v. Walters, 110 N.C. 251,
14 S.E. 734, 736.
The divisibility of the subject matter,
or the apportionment of the consideration,
while they are both items to consider in
determining whether a contract is entire
or severable, are not conclusive."
399 P.2d
at 641.
Analyzing the facts of the instant case in light of
the rules of law applicable to divisibility of contracts, the
Uniform Real Estate Contract here at issue clearly requires
Management Services to purchase lots 309, 310, 311, 312, 313,
314, 315, and 316 of the Daybreack Phase
$80,000.00 (R. 3).

III

Subdivision for

Although the language of the contract

speaks
for
both
Mr.
Whiteprovided
andby the
Marvin
A. Kirkham,
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President of Development Associates, testified that Management
Services agreed to purchase eight lots in the Daybreak Phase
III Subdivision:
Q.

(By Mr. Scott) I'm showing you here
what's marked as Exhibit Plaintiff's
2, would you identify that document
please?

A.

(By Mr. White)
Yes.
It's a Uniform
Real Estate contract dated December 7th,
1976 wherein Management Services Corporation
agrees to purchase eight lots in Daybreak
III Subdivision from Development Associates.

Q. And what was to be the purchase price on
those lots?
A. The purchase price was to be $10,000 per
lot.
Q. And the contract totalled $10,000 per lot
or $80,000?
A. $80,000.

* * *
Q.

(By Mr. Scott)
Okay.
Now, could I refer
you to Paragraph 19 of the Uniform Real
Estate Contract. Well, before I do, now
it's my understanding from your testimony-and please correct me if I'm wrong--that
under this Uniform Real Estate Contract you
were to sell eight lots to Ed White; is
that correct?

A.

(Mr. Kirkham)

We agreed to convey eight--

Q. Management Services?

A. --eight lots to Management Services
Corporation upon their payment.
Q. And they were to pay $80,000?

A. Total payment.

(R. 129, 266)
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In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
Court held:
"2. Plaintiff defaulted with respect to
the purchase of the first two lots, payment
for which was due in March of 1977, thereby
forfeiting all of his right, title and interest
therein.
3.
Defendant wrongfully terminated the
contract with respect to the remaining
six lots which were to be paid in full
by plaintiff in April, May and June of
1977."
(R. 100).
A careful analysis of the language of the contract,
trial transcript, depositions, and pleadings in the instant
case reveals the true intent of the parties and the

inconsisten~

of the trial court's conclusion that the contract was divisible.
Paragraph 3 of the contract states:
"3.
Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter
into possession and pay for said described
premises the sum of Eighty Thousand Dollars
($80,000.00) payable at the office of Seller,
his assigns or order 307 W. 200 s., SLC,
Utah 84101 strictly within the following
times, to-wit: Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00)
.
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledg~. '
and the balance of $79,200.00 shall be paid
as follows:
Beginning March 1, 1977, buyer to
complete payment on two (2} lots
($19,800.00) and thereafter to close
two (2) lots on the first of each month.
Total amount to be paid on or before
June 15, 1977.
Possession of said premises shall be delivered
to buyer on the 7th day of December, 1976.
If in fact plaintiff defaulted with respect to the purchase of
the first two lots, a finding which Management Services did not
appeal, the "first two lots" listed in the contract are lots
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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309 and 310.

The undisputed fact is, however, that Management

Services did not intend to "close" lots 309 and 310 on or before
March 1, 1977, as evidenced by Mr. White's letter dated March 23,
1977:
2) We are ready to take title to Lots 311
and 312 immediately.
The funds are now in
escrow at Western States Title Insurance
Co. for Lot 3311.
The funds will be deposited
with them immediately for Lot 312 ~pon their
notification that they have all of the
closing documents ready.
(R. 13). (emphasis
added)
It is also clear from the record that the reason for
allowing Management Services to take title to any two lots upon
payment of $19,800.00 on or before March 1, April 1, May 1
and June 1, 1977, was because Mr. White intended to make all
the contract installment payments with proceeds from the sales
of the lots (Depo. of Mr. White at 23).

If the parties had

not agreed that Management Services would receive title to any
two lots upon payment of $19,800.00 when due, title to all eight
lots would have remained in Development Associates because of
the following language which appears in Paragraph 19 of the
contract:
19. The Seller on receiving the payments
herein reserved to be paid at the time and
in the manner above mentioned agrees to
execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns,
a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying
the title to the above described premises
free and clear of all encumbrances except as
herein mentioned* * * (R. 10).
Moreover, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that
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Management Services intended to close until March 25, 1977,
twenty-five days after payment was due, and seven days after
the contract forfeiture notice was served upon Management
Services (R. 11-13).

For these reasons, the lower court should

have concluded that Management Services defaulted with respect
to all eight lots, not just "the first two lots".
What the lower court accomplished by its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in the instant case was
to rewrite the contract in favor of Management Services.
as the Idaho Court observed in Boesiger, supra,

But,

"* * * by

enforcing less than the whole, the Court imposes upon the
parties a contract to which they would not have assented, and
which in all likelihood they would not have voluntarily made.
The Court should not infringe the freedom of contract by
construction."

399 P.2d 641

(citation omitted).

Development Associates respectfully submits that by
severing the contract in the instant case, the lower Court
imposed upon the parties a contract to which Development AssociaW
would not have assented; that the judgment of the lower court
should be reversed; and that Development Associates should be
awarded reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $1,485.00
incurred in connection with the defense of this action (R. 276i.

CONCLUSION
The undisputed facts of the instant case reveal that
Management
Services agreed to purchase eight lots from DeveloprE
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Associates for $80,000.00; that an instalment payment of
$19,800.00 was due on or before March 1, 1977; that Management
Services never made the payment; that a contract forfeiture
notice was served upon Management Services March 19, 1977;
that Mr. White's response to the contract forfeiture notice
imposed conditions not contained in the contract and not contemplated by the parties; and that the default was never
remedied.

Because the total purchase price for all eight

lots was $80,000.00, and since the contract does not specifically
designate which lots were to be closed on the dates the instalment payments of $19,800.00 were due, it is respectfully submitted that Management Services defaulted with respect to all
eight lots, not just "the first two lots".

Therefore, the

contract must be construed as "entire" rather than divisible,
and the judgment of the lower court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
STEWART, YOUNG, PAXTON & RUSSELL

By:"'$~~

Steven H. Stewart
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
220 South Second East, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Attorneys for Respondent, 1100 Beneficial Life Tower, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, this 18th day of July, 1979.

~~~~
Steven H~Stewart
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